When the Royal Air Force took over responsibility for the defence of Aden in 1928 this also included keeping the hinterland tribes in order. This was called Air Control. Under Air Control there were several grades of Air Punishment. In a normal situation the RAF would start with a bombing demonstration on a hill or bit of wasteland in view of the tribe to be punished. The next stage would be to bomb the village, hamlet or fort concerned, always having given due warning that it was going to happen to avoid any innocent casualties.

In combination with these stages of Air Punishment there would either have been demands to pay a fine suitable to the crime committed or for the local chief or chiefs to hand over the culprits. There were only two other options available to the authorities, short of sending in government forces on the ground. The first was the taking of hostages from the tribe concerned, to be retained until government demands had been met. In some instances there was another stage of bombing available. This was to bomb the date palms on which the livelihood of the tribesmen depended. Buildings could be rebuilt quite easily, but trees could not be replaced so quickly.

The following is an episode of air punishment that went disastrously wrong, and one might even say led to those inflicting the punishment getting what many of those normally on the receiving end thought was their just reward. This episode is also a good example of the escalation of Air Control measures.

In early November 1939 it was decided that it was necessary to bring to order some of the sub-tribes of the Lower Aulaqi which had been raiding caravans on the trade route through their area. The tribes refused to treat with the political authorities, which led to the first level of Air Control being imposed. On 11 November an ultimatum was dropped from the air on the three villages concerned, demanding that they give up rifles and hostages as security. Non-compliance would lead to punitive air action. They were not given long to make up their minds as two days later four Vincents of 8 Squadron were deployed to landing strips at Balihaf and Fuwa, both on the coast to the West of Mukalla. On the 14^th these aircraft dropped bomb warnings (the next stage of Air Control) on the villages of Hami, Reida al Rashied and Reihun.

The following day another two again hit Hami whilst a further two set out for Reida. One of the two planes, L6647, had to turn back with engine trouble only five miles from its target. On its way back to Khormaksar, when about 40 miles from its target area, it had to make a forced landing near the Wadi Sanam about 15 miles northwest of  Irqa, which is on the coast just over half way between Aden and Mukalla. The crew of three were probably unhurt as they made out a signal ‘OK’ with stones. Meanwhile various local Arabs had been hurrying to the scene of the crash.

The first on the scene were five or six Bedouin, one of whom had served in the APL or the Government Guards. After he found out that the men were not armed the Bedouin decided to kill them in retaliation for the ‘air punishment’ that the tribes of at least three of the men were undergoing at the time – there was no chivalry in the hinterland and the taking of prisoners was unknown. As far as they were concerned they were at war. Some of the Bedouin were shepherds armed only with daggers or knives, whilst the others had rifles. The three crew were shared out and either shot or knifed to death.

Five hours after the plane had made a forced landing it was spotted, now burnt out, by the crew of another Blenheim who also saw the bodies lying near the plane. Two Vincents later landed in the wadi and brought the bodies into Khormaksar. Next day a letter was delivered to the local chief telling him to find the culprits. Copies of the letter were sent to the Sultan of the Lower Aulaqi and to the nearest Political Officer, who was at Balihaf. The local chief was told that a plane would land at Ahwar on 22 November, the safety of which was the responsibility of the Sultan, who was also to meet the aircraft on its arrival. In fact the local chief had arrived at the scene of the crash just too late to stop the killing of the crew. He would have realised that as the victims were servants of the government retribution would be of the severest form. Six names were soon produced and over the next few days corroboration of the names of those involved came from various sources, but in particular from a local who had been in the 1st Yemeni Infantry, who knew and respected Lieutenant Colonel Lake, the Political Secretary and the man responsible for security in the interior. This man had not been there when the incident occurred but had arrived a day or two later and had heard all the locals talking about it. He made a signed statement to Lake, giving the names of the culprits.

Meanwhile the air punishment of the three villages continued. Reida quite soon surrendered and a treaty with that village was signed at Balihaf on the 23rd. Bombing raids continued almost daily on the other two villages until 5 December. Raids were by between two and four aircraft and the method used varied between high-level and dive bombing.

It can be appreciated that the ‘stick and carrot’ of Air Punishment (or perhaps it should be carrot and stick) was the threat of action against the tribe that was used to achieve the required result. Unfortunately in the instance of the crashed Blenheim, the culprits were Bedouin and it would have been difficult to apply the normal pressure on the chiefs in the immediate area as the men were not of their tribe. As can be imagined the villagers were quick to say the culprits were Bedouin, to avoid retribution on their own village and livelihood. 
As befits an act of war the three crew of L6647, Pilot Officer M O Howell, Pilot Officer RJ Melville-Townsend and Aircraftsman 1st Class A U Smith, are buried in Maalla War Cemetery.