THE ADEN BOUNDARY COMMISSION 1902-05
Part 1 – January 1902 to March 1903
Until the beginning of the 20th Century there was no agreed
border between the British controlled Aden Protectorate and
Turkish controlled Yemen. It all depended on allegiance. The
Amiri were the most important border tribe under British
protection and in 1899 the new Amir of Dthala (the contemporary
spelling is used throughout this article) tried to expand his
territory by collecting taxes from some tribes that had at one
time been under the control of his predecessors but were
currently paying taxes to the Turks. Two years later, in 1901,
Turkish controlled tribesmen erected two forts near Al Dareja in
Haushabi country to the West of Dthala, the Haushabi being
another of the protected tribes. The British and Turkish
governments therefore agreed in early November 1901 that a Joint
Boundary Commission should be set up to agree and demarcate the
border between the Yemen and the Aden Protectorate.
The Aden Resident, Major General Maitland, had himself been a
member of the Afghan Boundary Commission in 1884-86 and he was
adamant that a full survey of the border area would be
necessary, with the production of maps at a scale of one inch to
the mile. For their part the Turks were quick to appoint a
Colonel as their Commissioner and the British looked around for
a suitable officer of similar rank. The obvious choice was
Colonel Wahab, a survey specialist who in 1891-92 as a Captain
had attempted to survey the border area to the West of Dthala.
Wahab was on his way back to India after leave in the UK and the
order was given for him to disembark at Aden and assume the
appointment of British Commissioner.
By mid-January 1902 the British commission was ready to set out
for Dthala. Apart from Wahab there were five other British
officers and one civilian. A survey party had been sent from
India and an escort of 72 men was found from the roulement
Indian Army battalion in Aden. Six mounted infantry from the
Aden Troop and 17 Indian Army sappers completed the military
detachment. The five other officers were Lieutenant Colonel Abud,
an experienced Aden hand who was appointed Deputy Commissioner,
the survey officer Lieutenant Tandy, an intelligence officer
Major Tod, a medical officer Captain Thompson and Major Doveton
who commanded the escort. The civilian was G Wyman Bury who was
officially there as naturalist to the commission, but having
‘gone native’ was the best Arabic speaker in Aden and also
someone who knew the area well from previous intelligence work
in the hinterland. The party arrived in Dthala on 26 January,
nearly a fortnight before the Turkish commission arrived at to
establish their camp at Al Jalela, the Turks not having
travelled during Ramadan.
Wahab’s first priority was to establish which tribes
historically owed allegiance to the Amir and over the next five
weeks he examined the Amir’s accounts and interviewed as many of
the chiefs as possible. His main concern was that the Turks were
holding the Jalela feature which dominated the route down to
Aden. The two camps were about four miles apart and on 8
February Wahab informed Colonel Remzi, his opposite number, that
he was proposing to move the British camp closer to the Turkish
camp. Remzi’s reply was a foretaste of difficult times ahead:
the move was not ‘convenient’ as according to the Turks the
location was not within British limits.
The sketch map below helps one understand the differences
between what the two parties were claiming. The Turks were
claiming a salient that ran SSE from Kataba, roughly two to
three miles wide and running parallel to the caravan route
through Al Jalela to the Jalela feature at the head of the
Kareba Pass. This salient was relatively flat and fertile.
The first formal meeting
of the Commission was held on the 11th and both
sides agreed that work should begin to the East of Kataba. Wahab
reported that this meeting was extremely cordial, influenced
perhaps by the fact that the Turks proposed that he should be
Chairman. The Turks stated that their remit was to define the
boundary between the province of Taiz and the ‘Nine Tribes’
(these being the nine tribes in the British Protectorate). This
was not necessarily going to be identical to the British aim,
which was to settle the northwest boundaries of the British
protectorate in South Arabia.
Nothing much was discussed at the 2nd formal meeting
on 3 March and at the next meeting two days later Wahab handed
over 30 sets of documents, 21 of which were historical and the
remainder sets of annual accounts. These documents were to
become the basis of British claims in the disputed areas.
Turkish detachments were based in several locations claimed by
Wahab, in particular on the Jebel Jihaf. The 4th
meeting was held on 8 March and the next a week later. As a
result of the British claims the Turkish position hardened
considerably, to the extent that the Turks could not even agree
as to which were the nine tribes under British protection. As
early as the end of February Maitland had warned India that
there were problems ahead. So much so that the next formal
meeting would not take place until November. The British
commission remained at Dthala to take advantage of the benign
climate compared to that of Aden.
The work of the Joint Commission was to be in three distinct
phases for each section of the border. A joint survey of the
likely border area would be followed by political agreement as
to which tribes should be either side of the border, and finally
joint marking out of the border by the erection of boundary
markers. That summer little could be done apart from getting to
know the terrain. Little surveying was possible due to not
knowing where the border was likely to be. For his part it was
not until 9 April that Wahab was able to confirm to Maitland
that he now knew exactly the limits of the Amir’s area. Given
the Turkish attitude Maitland more than doubled the escort to
180 infantry and 22 mounted infantry. He also set in train
contingency planning for the formation in Aden of a moveable
column.
At the end of July at an informal meeting of the Joint
Commission the Turks were invited to begin demarcation of the
northeast sector around Behan, leaving the more contentious
Dthala sector for later; the Turks declined, saying their
commission had no orders regarding the northeast. The next day
the Turks informed Wahab that they did not recognise the Yaffa,
the largest tribe in the northeast, as being on their list of
‘Nine Tribes’. At the end of September Wahab received a telegram
from the Secretary of State for India that the Turks had ordered
the evacuation of their posts in the disputed area and that the
Yaffa were after all on the Turkish list. More importantly the
Turks were ready to begin demarcation up to the Wadi Bana.
Turkish communications were somewhat slower and a month later no
new instructions had yet been received by Remzi. Therefore in
early November Maitland advised India that it was doubtful if
the Turks would withdraw from their positions without a show of
force. His biggest problem would be the hiring or purchase of
sufficient camels to carry the necessary supplies that a mobile
column would require. He could hire or buy 500 within a week but
it would take another four to six weeks to assemble the
remaining 2,000 that might be needed. To save money he did not
want to obtain any camels until the raising of a column had been
authorised. He suggested that if the Turks had not withdrawn by
15 November the hiring of camels should begin as the season for
military operations was a short one.
That same day as Maitland was telegraphing India, Wahab was
informed by Remzi that he had orders to withdraw from some
areas, including the Jihaf, but had received no orders regarding
the Yaffa. Remzi also suggested a formal meeting the following
day, 7 November, at the end of which Wahab was able to report
that it was evident that the attitude of the Turkish commission
had changed completely. However on 10 November Wahab reported
that the previous night Turkish patrols had come within a mile
of the British camp and had also patrolled to the head of the
Kareba Pass, the most vulnerable section of the line of
communication back to Aden. Wahab concluded that to ensure the
Turks carried out their promised withdrawal it would be
necessary to match the size of the Turkish forces in the border
area, about 400 infantry and four or five guns. He recommended
that part of the force should consist of British troops and the
moveable column be mobilised and a portion sent to Dthala, with
the main body being kept at Musemir or some place in the Tiban
valley where there were ample water supplies.
Two more formal meetings were held in November, at the beginning
of which month Abud had been replaced by Mr Fitzmaurice who had
come from the British Embassy in Constantinople where he was 3rd
Dragoman. As such he was a fluent Turkish speaker and the
intention was that he would be the British negotiator in future
meetings. Whereas Abud had been Deputy Commissioner, for status
purposes Fitzmaurice was appointed Joint Commissioner (and Wahab
henceforth referred to as ‘Senior Joint Commissioner’). In early
December Maitland left for India for the Durbar, as did the Amir
of Dthala, escorted by Abud. Lieutenant Colonel Ashby became
Acting Resident. On 11 December India authorised the sending of
a column of 400 men and a battery of four guns to Dthala. Since
the artillery in Aden was unsuitable for mobile operations a
mountain battery was to be sent from India.
On 29 December Ashby issued a rather unsatisfactory set of
orders to the commander of the column. Its task was to garrison
Dthala in the absence of the Boundary Commission and under
normal circumstances it was not to move from Dthala without
reference to the Resident. However in an emergency the officer
commanding was to comply with any order Wahab might give him, or
in Wahab’s absence act on his own initiative. There was to be no
offensive movement against the Turks or any tribes without the
express sanction of Government (i.e. India). The role of the
column was essentially defensive, but in the event that the
Turks or their levies attempted to occupy any place within an
area agreed to be British, they were to be opposed.
This is an apt moment to mention communications between Dthala
and Aden. Since deployment in January 1902 a two-way system of
camel-borne postal runners carried mail daily to and from
Dthala. Eight runners were employed to a timetable which allowed
each runner to remain within his own tribal area by working the
same ‘up’ and ‘down’ stage, covering on average about 11 miles
in each direction every day. Runners did not move at night and
the timetable allowed mail to get to Dthala in 25 hours and back
to Aden in 38. Equally pertinent was the time needed to get a
reply to a query. Four days to get a reply from Wahab and at
best two and a half to get a reply from the Residency. In theory
Wahab could also get a cabled reply from India in four and a
half days. This postal schedule was adequate for routine matters
and whilst the Commission remained in camp near Dthala. But once
deployed a quicker means of communication would be needed in the
event of an emergency. There were two possibilities: signalling
by heliograph or lamp or a telegraph line. In clear visibility
(most likely soon after first light) a heliograph link worked
quite well, either directly from Sham Sham to a signalling
station on Dthubiyat (and from there relayed to the camp outside
Dthala) or via a relay station at Chakka, some miles South of
Nobat Dakim, which place could also raise Sham Sham on
occasions. But this was hardly the belt to the braces of the
postal runners so when the column was mobilised it was also
decided, at considerable expense of installation but even
greater of running costs, to construct a telegraph line from the
Residency at Steamer Point to Dthala. A key factor was that the
Turks had a telegraph line from their Commission to Sanaa.
Ramadan finished on 30 December and three days later the Aden
Column left for Dthala. The first elements arrived on the 10th
and camped just North of Dthala town and to the South of the
commission camp. The arrival of the column brought the total
strength at Dthala to 700 men, including 225 British infantry,
which matched the Turks who had forces estimated as 300 at
Kataba and 400 with four guns at Jalela.
Remzi finally received his new orders on 21 January. The Yaffa
was one of the Nine Tribes and demarcation could begin in a
northeasterly direction from Kataba. The Turks were warned not
to increase the size of their escort beyond the 200 mark, nor to
reoccupy any of the disputed areas. During the second half of
February Wahab carried out three patrols in strength (125 to 300
men on each) to check that the Turkish forces had actually
withdrawn from the disputed areas, after which he informed the
Turks that this verification had been completed to his
satisfaction. On 22 March the Turks completed the withdrawal of
their commission camp from Jalela to Kataba and a week later
Wahab began moving his camp just North of the now vacated
Turkish customs post at Sanah, which was only one mile from the
Turkish camp at Kataba. After 14 months of virtual inactivity
work was about to begin in earnest.
Part 2 - April 1903 to January 1904
On 2 April 1903 a joint survey was begun in the Kataba area.
Wahab’s new camp was nine miles from Dthala and towards the end
of April 200 infantry and two guns from the Aden Column set up a
new camp alongside that of the Commission. This detachment
became the Supporting Column to the Commission with orders to
always be within 24 hours of the Commission when the latter was
on the move. In addition one-third of the main Aden Column was
kept at relatively short notice to move in the event of an
emergency.
Meanwhile some of the tribes astride the British line of
communication had been giving trouble, so much so that the Royal
Dublin Fusiliers had been retained in Aden when the Hampshires
had arrived to relieve them. It was to be another nine months
before the Dublins could be released. Maitland recommended to
India that he would need to deploy an additional 1,100 troops
into the Dthala area and that he would need reinforcements from
India of an Indian infantry battalion, half of a British
battalion ( a ‘wing’) and a British mountain battery (the one
already in Aden being Indian). The reinforcements were all
agreed and sent without delay. In mid-March a section of a
British field hospital arrived at Nobat Dakim, the same convoy
bringing up two sections of an Indian field hospital to Dthala.
Early in May extra logistics staff would arrive from India for
service in the hinterland. With only a handful of logisticians
ever in the hinterland the resupply system worked surprisingly
well.
On 16 May the ‘rapid reaction force’ of the Aden Column, at the
time referred to as a ‘flying column’, was deployed to follow-up
tribesmen who had removed 300 yards of telegraph wire near
Hardaba, between Dthala and Sulek. The force followed the
tribesmen to the village of Dthabra, well inside the Wadi Taym.
The village and its towers were destroyed and the force was back
in Dthala on 25 May. The Political Officer with this column, the
man who made the non-tactical decisions, was Captain Warneford -
an officer supposedly with a bright future.
For several months ill-feeling had been building up between
Maitland and Wahab. The problems were twofold: one concerned the
chain of command and the other, connected to the first, was that
Wahab was operating in Maitland’s patch. Regarding the latter
problem, in mid-May India informed Maitland that Wahab should
(i.e. must) be guided by the former’s advice as it was the
Resident who controlled the tribes and would have to make the
arrangements now being made function in the future. Maitland was
told to pass these orders on to Wahab. The chain of command was
that Wahab was only authorised to communicate directly with
India on matters of a technical nature. All other material had
to be sent via Maitland. Wahab was unhappy that there were
unnecessary delays in passing his non-technical requests and
reports on to India. Maitland was unhappy because of the
continued delays in demarcation, which latterly were partly of
Wahab’s making. Maitland was having to provide the considerable
logistical and operational support required for the hinterland
with what amounted to a very lightweight brigade headquarters
and a limited budget. Perhaps most importantly they disagreed as
which areas should be the priority for demarcation.
Their divergence of views came to a head on 6 June when Wahab,
using the telegraph line from Dthala to the Residency, sent a
very long telegram via Maitland to the Government of India in
which he was critical of Maitland’s plan and put forward his own
timetable. Maitland was furious and wired back to Wahab that a
letter would have been just as effective and would save the £200
or more that the telegram would cost to send to India by cable.
In the meantime Maitland was withholding the telegram. As can be
imagined Wahab was equally unhappy and asked for the original
telegram to be sent without further delay, with its original
date of despatch and with an additional piece at the end to
avoid the necessity of sending a second telegram. This was to
the effect that confusion regarding the northeast might have
been avoided if there had been more direct communication between
Government and the Commission regarding the latter’s work. Or in
other words if Wahab was allowed to deal directly with India.
Wahab justified the cost of the telegram, equal to the cost of
keeping the Commission in the field for one day, by the fact
that it might reduce by several months the duration of the
Commission.
In July they were both still jockeying for position. Maitland
was infuriated by another of Wahab’s telegrams to India in which
the latter said he suspected the Resident as having detained or
suppressed other telegrams and that as a result important
decisions on boundary questions might be made against Wahab’s
advice. The Commission could not accept responsibility unless
this was put a stop to. This upset Maitland not a little but his
explanations for the delays in forwarding telegrams were not
believed and in due course would bring censure from India. To
bypass Maitland Wahab followed up this telegram with a long
letter of complaint to Calcutta. On 9 August Wahab won the
battle if not the war when Calcutta informed Maitland that to
save a mail (i.e. a delay of a week) the Commission in future
could forward important despatches (by telegram or letter)
direct to India, but with copies to the Resident, the India
Office in London and the British Embassy in Constantinople. In
case of necessity the Resident could communicate his opinion by
telegram, having presumably seen his copy before other
addressees had received theirs. On 11 August Maitland reacted in
puerile fashion to this arrangement. Wahab had sent a telegram
direct to India which merited an opinion by Maitland. Instead he
made what in Simla was described as an extremely foolish
comment. Maitland’s telegram brought a sharp response from one
of the information addressees - the India Office in London. In
short the Secretary of State would replace one or both the
officers concerned if they did not sort out their differences.
Maitland was ordered to communicate the contents of this
telegram to Wahab and the former set off for Dthala as soon as
he was able in order to make his peace with Wahab.
Maitland visited Wahab on 22 August when they discussed
arrangements for escorting survey parties for the survey up to
the Wadi Bana. Maitland suggested that he should be responsible
for escorting them and that Captain Warneford should be in
political charge. The Resident decided to remain at Dthala for
the time being and on 24 August Wahab accepted Maitland’s plan
and offered Tandy to be in charge of the overall survey which
was due to start work on 31 August. The main base for the survey
would be near Awabil, which was on a high plateau 13 miles
northeast of Dthala. From this plateau it would be possible to
have line-of-sight to both the camp in Dthala (possibly via
Dthubiyat) and to the survey party and its escort at Rubiaten on
the Wadi Bana.
With the Commission and its escort on the move it was now
necessary for the Supporting Column to shadow them within a
day’s march. Problems were soon encountered, not with the Turks
but with local tribes who imagined that the survey work was a
precursor to increased taxes. On 4 September in a skirmish four
miles East of Awabil one of the two Assistant Surveyors was shot
and killed, in spite of his having a 50-man escort. On hearing
the firing Warneford took another 50 men from Awabil to
investigate and, as was normal practice, subsequently ordered
the village concerned to be razed to the ground. On hearing of
this incident Maitland sent another 100 men from Dthala to
Awabil, together with Fitzmaurice and Major Redl, who had
replaced Tod as intelligence officer. Two days later he sent
another 200 men and two guns to Awabil. When they arrived there
the force at Awabil was split, with Tandy and a survey party
moving to Rubiaten on the Wadi Bana, with an escort commanded by
Delamain and a second supporting column under Captain Sherwell.
Warneford as Political Officer was controlling this deployment.
On 12 September Maitland, still at Dthala and whilst dining with
his ADC and Bury, received a report from Warneford that he had
heard that a dissident tribal chief, Sheikh Saleh, with 1,000
men was advancing towards Rubiaten where the survey party was
working. Maitland then set out himself at first light the next
morning for Awabil with a further 300 men, mainly Royal Dublin
Fusiliers, together with the remaining four guns of 6 Mountain
Battery, leaving Colonel Scallon, the commander of the Aden
Column, with the remainder of the rapidly diminishing garrison
at Dthala. On arrival at Awabil on the morning of the 14th
he found that the garrison there had been attacked the previous
morning by part of Saleh’s force, estimated at 500 rifles.
Saleh’s losses were estimated at 20 dead and 40 wounded. The
Awabil position was quite a strong one but a group of attackers
had got to within 200 yards and then put enfilade fire into the
sector of the defences held by the Hampshires whose casualties
were one dead and four wounded.
Warneford’s force finished their survey work on the 15th,
following which all the various detachments returned to their
camps at Sanah and Dthala. On the 21st Wahab was able
to inform Maitland that the Turks had more or less agreed to
what would be the line of the border in Haushabi country. A week
later the Resident left for Aden and on 11 October the first
boundary pillars were erected east of Sanah. A few days later
Wahab was able to report that demarcation had been completed
from the Wadi Bana to a point near Al Ukla.
Meanwhile the survey parties had been working on another sector
of the border, with an excellent level of cooperation between
the two halves of the joint commission. Both were in the same
boat, in that they would have to live in tented camps until the
job was completed. Wahab and Remzi had already been in the field
for over 18 months. As an example of cooperation Tandy and
Fitzmaurice had moved to the Mares area on 7 October, with an
escort provided by the Turks as due to the inhospitable terrain
the border could only be reached from the Turkish side. On the
24th Wahab was informed that the Turks had more or
less accepted the line of the border in the Dakkam area and that
the joint survey there could now commence. Joint even to the
extent that a joint camp would be established at Masharah. Not
for the first time there was now a distraction away from the
border area.
On 28 October a major outpost on the line of communication, at
Sulek and on the edge of the Radfan, was reported as having been
under attack for two days. Wahab postponed the move of the
commission to Masharah, sending only the survey element. A
column including four guns was sent from Dthala to reinforce
Sulek. As it happened the Hampshires were on their way back up
to Dthala after a spell in Aden and had left their camp on the
isthmus on the 27th. Early on the 29th
they received orders to push on at best speed and managed to
cover 23 miles in one day, which was double the normal distance
in that heat. Following this incident the strength of the post
at Sulek was doubled to 150 men.
On 8 November India telegraphed Maitland to express disquiet
about reports of increased operational activity. The Resident
only received this telegram on the 14th as he was on
the move in the Radfan. He replied that operations had been
forced on him by the Kotaibi who had shot and killed the two
mounted infantry who were escorting the mail runner and had then
attacked the fort at Sulek so persistently that he had been
forced to send a column to relieve it. He then warned India that
the demarcation of the Subaihi border in the southwest could be
a potential problem. This aggressive tribe, due to its isolated
location had long acted with immunity and the demarcation of
this area of the border would require the greatest care and
firmness. A month previously Maitland had warned India that he
was running out of reserves and he now asked for an immediate
reinforcement of another wing (half-battalion) of Indian
troops.
Meanwhile the Commission had continued to make progress. On 6
November the Commission’s camp was moved to Mariah in the Wadi
Tiban. By the 11th the survey of the Tiban had been
completed as far as Jebel Sarir and two days later Tandy moved
with the Turkish surveyors to survey the Jebel Haska, another
area only accessible from the Turkish side. However with Ramadan
due to begin on the 20th, on the 15th the Turkish
Commission returned to Kataba, Wahab and Fitzmaurice returning
to Sanah the same day. Some survey work continued during
Ramadan. On the 30th one of Tandy’s Assistants, with
a Turkish escort, reached the Haushabi border West of the Tiban.
Early in December the joint commission moved to Ukla to agree
the boundary in the area of Jebel Barkan. In another example of
continued cooperation on 14 December Wahab offered to provide an
escort for the Turkish commission down to the Haushabi border in
the event that the Turks didn’t have enough troops to provide
their own escort as well as guarding their camp at Kataba - the
garrison there having been reduced due to increasing unrest
elsewhere in the Yemen, which would eventually break into civil
war. Although it would take another month to complete
demarcation down to the Haushabi border, also on the 14th
Wahab hired a further 140 camels that would be needed for the
next phase, the survey and demarcation down to the coast. An
advance party was sent to try to improve the track at the North
end of the Tiban gorge so that it could be used by laden camels.
On the 18th the Commission moved camp to Tusan, 13
miles NNW of Musemir and 15 miles SW of Dthala.
On 13 January the Joint Commission met to agree on the section
of border in Haushabi country and ten days later Wahab was able
to report that 34 out of 40 miles of border in that area had
been agreed, with maps being signed up the following day as far
as Jebel Jalisa. However there now followed a four day delay in
moving camps as the Turkish deputy was seriously ill, the new
British MO visiting him daily. Survey parties continued to work
and Wahab lent the Turks 50 camels and also allowed them to use
tracks on the British side of the border. Wahab recorded that
the Turks were having trouble with some of their local chiefs
who were suspicious that the survey was a cover to get tax
collectors into the area.
This had been a very successful nine and a half months with the
most important part of the border having been finished, largely
due to the excellent joint co-operation between the two
commissions. There remained the Subaihi border, which was to
present particular problems of its own.
Part 3 -
February
1904 – April 1905
Whilst the Haushabi border was being demarcated much
planning and preparation had been going on for the move into
the Subaihi section of the border. This area was going to be
difficult for several reasons: first there was the total
absence of any surface water and the lack of sufficient
wells; secondly, as the area of operations moved towards the
coast and away from the mountains, combined with the onset
of the hot weather season, daytime temperatures would become
difficult to bear; thirdly at least one new line of
communication back to Aden would be required; fourthly the
Subaihi had a bad reputation. Wahab had had trouble there
during his survey work in 1891-92 and the Subaihi did not
reckon on owing allegiance to anyone. They had a reputation
for trickery and not for nothing were they known as the
‘children of the dawn’ for their propensity for dawn attacks
on the unwary. How were these problems to be mitigated or
overcome?
Although the Commission had been living under canvas one can
imagine that the officers would have still lived in some
style. Wahab decided that it would have to travel on light
scales and on 12 January all non-essential camp stores and
other equipment were sent back to Aden. At the same time, to
reduce the requirement for forage for his horses and mules,
he also sent back 51 of the 63 mules which he had retained
when the Indian mountain battery had been sent back to India
in May the previous year. In addition Wahab requested that
the 12 horse-mounted sowars from the Aden Troop be replaced
with camel-mounted sowars, the Troop having equal numbers of
both on its establishment. The day prior to the move across
the Subaihi border on 6 February Wahab halved the daily
water ration to one and a half gallons per man per day for
all uses and allocated 21 of his camels for carrying a
reserve of water. The combination of terrain and climate had
however produced one bonus. Few tribesmen lived in the
border area and the terrain was very infertile and with the
exception of the section near the coast the Turks would be
pretty indifferent as to the line of the border. On
Christmas Eve Wahab had been able to inform India that the
Turks had agreed to the survey of the Subaihi border being
done on a reduced scale of map (two miles to the inch,
instead of one).
The first new line of communication was set up from Nobat
Dakim through Musemir. There was already a small outpost
near Musemir, a relic from the Ad Daraja expedition of 1901
to destroy the two Turkish forts mentioned earlier. Wahab
had moved his camp (still on full scales) there on 24
December and on to Ad Dareja on Christmas Day. But the
Subaihi border ran in a southwesterly direction and the L of
C through Musemir would soon become redundant as far as the
Commission was concerned, requiring another to be
established through Am Rija via Sheikh Othman. But the Nobat
to Musemir section would still be needed to resupply the
Aden Column which arrived at Musemir on 13 January. On 21
January, still over a fortnight before the move into Subaihi
territory was due to commence, Wahab had the foresight to
suggest to Maitland that in due course the L of C for the
Commission itself should be changed to being via Ras Ara on
the coast, about five miles East of Hiswa, with supplies
being sent by sea from Aden to Ras Ara.
Wahab’s route into Subaihi country would be over the Minjara
Pass, some 10 miles SSW of Musemir, he having been advised
by a visiting Subaihi chief that this was the only
practicable route when approaching from the North. One must
not forget that Wahab was working in Maitland’s ‘patch’ and
it was the latter who determined the deployment and force
levels required to support the Commission. On 14 January
Maitland informed India of his plans. His aim was to overawe
the Subaihi with the threat of an attack in force from more
than one direction. The Sultan of Lahej’ s view was that
this aim was being achieved and that as long as the threat
was maintained the Subaihi would not obstruct the passage of
the Commission to any great extent. The infantry units at
Maitland’s disposal were 950 Buffs, 450 Hampshires (the
other half of the battalion having been sent to British
Somaliland) and two Indian battalions each about 700 strong,
altogether a total of about 2,800 men. The defence of Aden
itself and guard duties there required a minimum of 500 men
and the protection of a not yet fully expanded L of C at
least 400 more. Now that the Aden Column had left Dthala a
garrison of about 400 was still needed there. This left
Maitland with about 1,400 men to deploy in the southwest. On
16 January he informed India that the Aden Column at Musemir
now consisted of 800 infantry, including 450 of the
Hampshires, 6 (British) Mountain Battery and 20 camel sowars
of the Aden Troop. Half of this force was kept at a short
notice to provide a ‘flying column’. The escort with the
Commission was 150 infantry, plus a few sappers and camel
sowars. 450 infantry, including 300 men of the Buffs,
recently arrived in Aden, were ready to move out from Aden
via Am Rija to Dar-al-Kudaimi, some 12 miles WNW of Am Rija.
Fortunately by this time Maitland had been promised another
wing (half-battalion) from India. These and all remaining
available troops, would be needed to secure the Ls of C. If
necessary Maitland estimated that the Sultan of Lahej could
provide a force of about 200 mounted horsemen or camelmen.
This would in effect be his only reserve. He again stressed
the need to maintain the threat of prompt attack on the
Subaihi. Wahab on the other hand expressed his opinion that
this show of force might be counter-productive. There were
the makings of another set-to between these two officers and
in Bombay the thought was that Wahab, after his experience
of the Subaihi in 1891-92, really ought to trust Maitland’s
judgement and attend to his own business. The parties
concerned in Aden were told by Bombay that all arrangements
with the tribes must be left to the discretion of the
Resident.
Soon after the Aden Column reached Musemir it was visited by
Delamain (still commanding the Commission’s close escort) to
liaise concerning the impending move to the southwest. It
was considered expedient for the commission to have some
artillery of its own, so two guns from 6 Battery were
detached. However standing operational procedures demanded
that British artillery had to have a British infantry
escort. This was provided by 40 men from the Hampshires,
with one maxim. In early February the commission moved camp
to Karash, from where final preparations were made for the
move into Subaihi territory.
The next problem was that the Aden Column in Musemir, due to
the difficulty of the terrain, would be two days march from
the commission and therefore unable to provide the timely
response required as a supporting column. A 'flying column'
of 400 men, under command of Major de Winton of the
Hampshires, was sent therefore to the Minjara Pass to cover
the move of the Commission through the pass and then to
remain there to provide the supporting column. Wahab’s party
numbered about 275 men, this being the maximum number it was
estimated could be replenished with water from wells in the
area to be traversed. For the same reason it was decided
that de Winton’s column would not move further South except
in an emergency.
As a result of good planning a new Supporting Column was to
hand. The detachment from Aden, mainly Buffs and under the
command of Major Ravenhill of that Regiment, now down to 350
men having dropped 100 off at Am Rija to secure this L of C,
arrived at Dar-al-Kudaimi on 8 February, only five miles
from where the commission was now encamped. Since leaving
Minjara Wahab had found very little well water and he had
none to give to the 350 transport camels with the
Commission. The next day the new supporting column heard the
sound of the guns with the Commission being fired. It had
been fired on from a village but did not require assistance.
As a precaution de Winton’s column was ordered to remain at
Minjara for the time being. A company of Indian infantry
arrived from Aden at Am Rija on the 14th, thus
allowing the 100 men to rejoin Ravenhill's column. The CO of
the Hampshires, Lieutenant Colonel Buckley, was still at
Musemir with half of his original Aden Column. With him in
political control was Warneford, whilst Bury had the same
function alongside Ravenhill. On 13 February Maitland sent
an officer in the station ship to do a reconnaissance of
landing and water facilities at Ras Ara.
Two days later Wahab was again complaining about the
unnecessary strength of the force backing up the Commission.
From now on the availability of water would be the limiting
factor, not the need to overawe the Subaihi. On the 16th
Wahab asked Ravenhill to send 300 infantry and two guns to
join him in the Wadi Madin, where there was an abundant
supply of water. The next day Maitland informed India he was
sending out another 150 men to hold posts to the rear of
Ravenhill’s column.
All this increased operational activity had caught the eye
of the politicians in London. With a view to answering a
question in Parliament, on 18 February the Secretary of
State for India cabled Maitland asking him to provide
details of the composition of troops deployed in the
hinterland, and also the number of casualties since January
1902 when the Commission had moved to Dthala. The timing of
this request was fortuitous as in the absence of location
states it is the only complete state on record, and that
within a few days of the maximum numbers deployed. The state
was sent by return on 19 February, but would appear to have
been the deployment on about the 13th. The location state is
at Annex A. Numbers of artillery personnel have been
estimated, as the original state only mentions the number of
guns.
The casualty return took a week to prepare, and even then
its accuracy was not guaranteed.
| |
Killed in Action |
|
|
British soldiers
|
Indian soldiers
|
Camp followers |
|
4 |
6 |
1 |
| |
|
|
| |
Died from Disease |
|
|
British soldiers |
Indian soldiers |
Camp followers |
|
15 |
13 |
5 |
Total deaths 44
The wounded amounted to between 30 and 40, including one
British officer. In addition a considerable number of men
had been invalided. As an example of the latter on 24
October 1903, after only eight months in Aden, about 15% of
the Hampshires were invalided back to England. Dysentry was
the main killer, for example six men of the Hampshires
succumbing within a six week period in May/June 1903.
Malaria, although seldom a killer when treated with quinine,
was the chief incapacitator. Nobat Dakim and Musemir were
particularly bad locations for malaria, due to the camps
being close to mosquito breeding grounds. It might seem
strange that only one British officer was a casualty, (the
OC at Sulek being seriously wounded when the outpost had
been attacked in October 1903). But there were not many
British officers serving in Aden. Indian battalions had only
six or seven and even the Hampshires had only nine in the
hinterland.
In spite of the number of ‘battle casualties’ that had been
incurred the reply to the parliamentary question mentioned
above included the sentence ‘there have been no military
operations in the Aden hinterland’. This was not well
received by those on the ground! It was also probably the
main reason why no campaign medal was ever issued, although
subsequent lobbying would lead to an entry in the service
records of those concerned that they had been on active
service. A few gallantry medals were awarded, including a
DSO to the OC of the rearguard (a future Aden Resident) and
a DCM to one of his junior NCOs, both Hampshires, during the
withdrawal from the punitive expedition into the Radfan
October-November 1903, when the company forming the
rearguard had had one soldier killed and another eight
wounded.
That part of the original Aden Column, mostly Hampshires,
that had remained at Musemir had become redundant by
mid-February. The main body of this regiment arrived back in
Aden on 28 February. Bury, the Political officer with
Ravenhill, had been made an Extra Assistant Resident the
year before and with the return of the Aden Column to Aden
Wameford as a professional Assistant was ordered to proceed
to Ravenhill’s camp to take over from Bury as Political
Officer. At Am Rija Warneford was shot and killed by one of
the six men of his close escort. Maitland then sent out
Davies, his 1st Assistant, to take over from
Bury. Davies was to remain with Ravenhill until this column
was recalled at the end of April.
On 6 March Maitland suggested to Wahab that when the
Commission reached Turan, some 11 miles North of Ras Ara,
the supporting column could be withdrawn and that Wahab hand
over to Fitzmaurice, who would then finish the remainder of
the border down to Turba. Wahab quite correctly foresaw
problems ahead and elected to remain to see the job done as
far as the coast. India asked Maitland on 9 March if he was
ready to release the Hampshires and if he wanted to retain 6
Mountain Battery. He replied that the situation should allow
the Hampshires to leave at about the end of April. He would
liked to have retained 6 Battery but this unit had suffered
particularly badly from malaria and should leave as soon as
possible. He would however like to retain one section for
the time being.
Wahab’s water problems worsened by the week. Wherever
temporary camps were set up there was usually only a single
well and this of limited capacity. On 8 April 139 camel
drivers, fearful of the conditions ahead, deserted with
their camels, although some were rounded up. On the 10th
with survey parties suffering from dehydration, Wahab
ordered that in future a camel with a load of water should
accompany each party. On the 11th a large
proportion of the British detachment were reported as
suffering from heat exhaustion. The intelligence officer,
Redl, and the MO were sent out to examine wells in the
neighbourhood. Even when good wells were found it was
increasingly evident that a large body of troops soon
exhausted what had initially seemed to be a plentiful
supply. This did nothing to improve relations with the local
tribesmen. In an attempt to alleviate the problems of lack
of water and heat exhaustion, on 11 April Wahab ordered
Ravenhill to send 300 men to Turan. Everyone in excess of
that number, plus his remaining two guns, were to return to
Aden via Am Rija. Maitland countermanded both parts of this
order. The supporting column must remain within one day’s
march of the commission and the guns, because of the
problems with heat exhaustion must be taken out via Ras Ara.
He also insisted that posts on the L of C via Am Rija must
not be withdrawn until the new L of C via Ras Ara was
operational. He also put pressure on Wahab to complete all
commission work down to the coast. He was determined to have
the Buffs return to Aden before the onset of the hottest
weather and gave 30 April as the cut-off date for their
remaining under canvas.
On the 13th with the British gunners and the
escort to the maxim (the 70 British soldiers with the
Commission) showing signs of being affected by the excessive
heat, Wahab arranged to dispense with all British troops
with the escort, except for one gun crew. But Maitland was
again furious with Wahab for giving orders to troops that
were not under his direct command and felt it necessary to
express his views in a ‘clear the line’ telegram to Wahab.
But he had also got the message about heat exhaustion and
telegraphed India that he hoped the withdrawal of the
Hampshires and 6 Battery from Aden would not be delayed as
the health of both units was bad and not improving. On the
18th Maitland informed Simla that all British
troops with Ravenhill (Buffs) would be embarked at Ras Ara
on the 23rd. He also suggested to Wahab that the
detachment of Hampshires with its two guns be embarked on
the 27th, warning that the retention of British
soldiers near the coast was in his opinion risking serious
loss of life. Wahab took the decision to bring forward the
embarkation of the Hampshires also to the 23rd,
thus leaving only 330 Indian soldiers in the field, split
more or less as Maitland had suggested ten days or so
earlier. On the 28th India was informed that the
supporting column had officially ceased to exist.
The only line of communication now operating was that via
Ras Ara, with the station ship making one round trip each
week. On the 24th the joint commission was only
as far as the area of Mudariba, to the West of which there
was a portion of disputed border. There was a large tract
that belonged to the Subaihi but which had been paying taxes
to the Turks. The latter warned that they were not willing
to continue to cooperate if there was to be any alteration
to their draft, which had their proposed border marked by a
red line on the map, as opposed to the purple line on
Wahab’s map. The Turkish commission had evidently had enough
of living rough as on the 29 April they announced that they
intended moving their commission to their fort at Turba, on
the coast. In India it was realised that an impasse had been
reached but Bombay saw no reason why Wahab should give in to
Turkish demands and that he should continue to demarcate on
the basis of the purple line.
The Turkish commission moved to Turba on 15 May. Although
delimitation had been completed only as far as Mudariba
Wahab decided to ask the Resident to transfer the Commission
less its escort to Perim. This was done on the night of21-22
May, the escort being shipped back to Aden in two halves
over the next three days. With quite a lot of survey work
still to be completed before delimitation of the final
stretch could be agreed with the Turks, survey parties were
soon sent back to the border from Perim and by 31 May they
had completed their work up as far as Akama and Akkar, i.e.
to the actual limit of Subaihi territory. At that point the
Turks objected to survey parties entering the military zone
around Turba.
On 4 June Fitzmaurice was ordered to remain at Perim until
maps had been exchanged with the Turks. This was expected to
take about four weeks, but in the event he would have to
remain on Perim another 11 months. The others fared
considerably better. On the 6th Wahab was told he
could send the survey parties back to India and the next day
he received the news he personally had been waiting for: he
could leave forthwith. He wrote to Maitland that the last
three months had just about finished him and he thought he
would never be fit to work again. (He would retire from the
Army the following year, aged only 50.) In Bombay it was
appreciated that Wahab had done an excellent job, for which
he had not received the credit he deserved, due to his
services being understated and at times deprecated by
Maitland.
The field part of the Joint Commission’s task was now
virtually complete. Most of the negotiating over the next 10
months would be done by the British Ambassador in
Constantinople, to agree the line of border for the final
few miles down to the coast and also to negotiate the border
East of the Wadi Bana. By April 1905 all parties had had
enough. For the Turks there was the added diversion of a
major civil war in the Yemen that had begun in earnest back
in December 1904. On 15 April 1905 it was proposed that in
the northeast the boundary would be on a true bearing NE
from the last pillar that had been erected near Harib. This
proposal was soon accepted. The compass bearing was
described as defining the dividing line of the sphere of
influence between Britain and Turkey, as opposed to a
border. It was mainly desert, anyway. On 30 April
Fitzmaurice reported that three pillars had been erected on
the coast to the east of Turba and that he would be leaving
Perim for Aden that evening. He would return to the Embassy
at Constantinople with well-earned promotion to 2nd
Dragoman.
Annexure A - ADEN HINTERLAND LOCATION STATE 13 FEBRUARY 1904
|
Location |
Function |
Units |
Strength |
|
Wadi Madin |
Escort to the Commission |
British infantry |
40 |
|
Indian infantry |
175 |
|
2 guns camel battery |
Est 30 |
|
Det
Sappers & Miners |
12 |
|
Musemir |
Aden Column |
British infantry |
190 |
|
Indian infantry |
180 |
|
2 guns mule battery |
Est 30 |
|
Det
Aden Troop |
14 |
|
Dthala |
Rear Party Aden Column |
British infantry |
253 |
|
Indian infantry |
150 |
|
2 guns camel battery |
Est 30 |
|
Minjara Pass |
Flying Column (detached from Aden Column) |
British infantry |
131 |
|
Indian infantry |
158 |
|
2 guns mule battery |
Est 30 |
|
Nobat Dakim |
HQ Line of Communication |
British infantry |
99 |
|
Indian infantry |
76 |
|
2 guns mule battery |
Est 30 |
|
Sulek |
Outpost on L of C to Dthala |
Indian infantry |
83 |
|
Det
Sappers & Miners |
36 |
|
Det
Aden Troop |
4 |
|
Al Mileh |
Outpost on L of C to Dthala |
Indian infantry |
31 |
|
Det Aden Troop |
2 |
|
Dar-al-Kudaimi |
Subaihi Column (supporting column to the
Commission) |
British infantry |
304 |
|
Indian infantry |
48 |
|
2 guns camel battery |
est 30 |
|
Det Aden Troop |
12 |
|
Am Rija |
Outpost on L of C to Kudaimi (det from
Subaihi Column) |
Indian infantry |
103 |
|
Det
Aden Troop |
2 |
|
Various |
Miscellaneous
small outposts |
Indian infantry |
34 |
Administrative and logistic sub-units were not included in the
return, nor were camp followers. With 5,000 camels being used by
the Supplies and Transport Branch with units, but more
particularly on the lines of communication, the number of camp
followers would have been considerable.
To arrive at the maximum deployment one must add the 100 men
sent out to Am Rija. (Their non-inclusion dates the return as
being as at about 13 February). Not included either are the
extra 150 men Maitland on the 17th said he was sending out to
man posts on the new L of C; there is no record that these were
ever actually deployed. The maximum deployment, not counting
Services and camp followers was therefore around 2,500, a not
inconsiderable total given the spread out deployment needing
three lines of communication and the consequent difficulties of
resupply.
