Lahej 1915
 

The problem on 1 July, yet another very hot day, was a lack of hard intelligence as to Turkish intentions. There were no reports of a Turkish advance across the border. On 2 July OC Perim reported that his agents at Sheikh Syed had told him that the attack on Lahej would be made in three columns via Hujeria, Mauia and Dthala. Events would show that this was accurate information. That evening Jacob was informed by the Sultan of Lahej that the main body of Turks from Mauia had arrived at Al Dareja and that their advance guard at was at Mileh. In addition another column from Hujeria had reached Habil Masweda via Wadi Akkan. Hujeria was North of Sheikh Syed and Habil Masweda was between MusAmir and Nobat Dakim. This was the column that had left Sheikh Syed towards the end of May. This news prompted Shaw to send a telegram later the same evening to the CGS saying that unless he received orders to the contrary he intended to deploy the Aden Movable Column (AMC) to Sheikh Othman the following afternoon (3 July). A warning order for the move was also issued to Aden Brigade.

Part 2 - The Advance to Lahej and the Retreat back to Aden

[Note: The use of the word ‘retreat’ rather than ‘withdrawal’ is intentional, as will become apparent]

Part 1 ended with the issue of a Warning Order for the Aden Moveable Column to deploy to Lahej. The Column was to consist of about 1,000 infantry, drawn from four separate battalions, two artillery batteries, one of six 15-pdrs drawn by camels and the other a pack battery of four 10-pdrs carried on camels. There were also four machine gun sections, one a brigade section and the others from three of the four battalions, and a very weak engineer company. This is an appropriate moment to mention that battalions of Indian troops consisted of four double rifle companies, each double company having 180 - 200 men. At that stage of the war a battalion seldom had more than about nine or ten British officers; thus not all individual companies (i.e. half a double company) were commanded by British officers. Two double companies of the 109th were to form the Advance Guard and the order of march of the Main Body was to be:

• Battalion HQ and one double company 126th Baluchis

• Fortress Company Sappers & Miners (-)

• 10-pdr battery

• detachment  23rd Sikh Pioneers (providing signallers and Column HQ)

• 15-pdr battery

• Battalion HQ and four companies 1^st  Brecknockshires

• field hospital

• ammunition column

• 1^st  line transport

• reserve of water

One can see that right from the start the British battalion was being given a lesser role than that normally given to battalions within a brigade of the Indian Army. One would have expected the battalion to have formed the advance guard or at least the leading element of the main body. But it was acknowledged that the Brecknocks were still neither fit enough nor sufficiently trained to justify being given a leading role.

At six that evening the GOC went out to Sheikh Othman to see commanding officers of the infantry units and to inform them that the march must be continued at 0300 hrs the following morning. They nearly all protested, explaining how done their men were after the heat of the march to Sheikh Othman. But General Shaw had not been there to see how trying the conditions had been and he explained that an ‘effort’ must be made. (Like the word ‘demonstration’ the word ‘effort’ had a particular meaning in the context of orders. In effect it was an order to press on as quickly as possible.) He then placed Lt Col Pearson in command of the Main Body and directed it to march at 0300 hrs. Pearson was the CO of the 23rd Sikh Pioneers, two companies of which were defending Perim. The 23^rd was an infantry battalion with additional training as assault pioneers. Only 85 others from Pearson’s battalion went out with the moveable column on its initial deployment. These included his two machine gun sections as column troops and a weak platoon providing the escort to the 15-pdr battery. But his unit also provided 15 signallers, two for his own detachments but more interestingly 13 described as ‘brigade signallers’. The War Diary of the 23rd has him leaving Aden as ‘Temporary Commandant Mobile Column’, with his Adjutant, Captain Squires, designated as ‘Staff Officer’. In effect the 23rd from the outset provided column headquarters. On deployment of the column the two professional staff officers of Aden Brigade, the GSO2 and the DAA&QMG, remained at their desks in Aden. This was what had occurred in 1901 and 1903 when sizeable columns had been deployed away from Fortress Aden, under command of the senior Lieutenant Colonel of the units involved. It is easy to say now that General Shaw should have commanded the column from the outset; however his duties as Resident, and the fact that over half his troops were still in Aden, plus the need for him to be contactable by the CGS in India determined that he should only come out to take command in the field once deployment to Lahej was complete. (It is worth noting here that Shaw’s successor, Major General Younghusband, did not actually command the brigade which re-took Sheikh Othman later in July)

Before returning to Aden Shaw took one further decision, one that would have important implications for the morrow. He decided that the column would advance from Sheikh Othman to Lahej along the Bir Amr route and not by the Fiyush route which was the one that had been prepared for use and had the best surface. An engineer officer had just been along the Fiyush route and had assessed it to be in fair condition. No reason for the change is given in the War Diary, although the greater number of wells on the Bir Amr route was probably the deciding factor.

Shaw then returned to Aden from where he sent a cable to the CGS. This made no mention of the problems encountered on the march to Sheikh Othman due to the heat. Only that a small detachment of the 109^th Infantry with some Maxims were ‘being pushed up in motors’ at midnight 3/4 July to support the Aden troop which was already at Lahej. He also mentioned that the Movable Column would resume its march at 0300 hrs on the 4^th.

Colonel Jacob then tried to persuade Shaw not to go out to Lahej until 6 July because his assessment was that the Turks would never come. The GSO made an entry in the War Diary that he himself succeeded in convincing the GOC that they would. Shaw than made the decision not to leave Aden to join up with the Column till 1500 hrs the following day, 4 July. Jacob obtained permission to postpone his own departure until the 6^th. In truth he should have already have been in Lahej with the advance guard.

On the morning of the 4^th the GSO realised that a departure at 1500 hrs was too late and he persuaded the GOC to leave an hour or so earlier. On the way out the two cars carrying the GOC’s party stopped at the Keith Falconer hospital at Sheikh Othman, where many of the heat exhaustion cases were being treated. The GSO was aware that commanders at Lahej must be waiting to receive new orders from Shaw and at 1530 hrs he had to urge the GOC to press on without delay. From now on things were to go from bad to worse for the command group in its attempt to get forward. The diary entry for 1700 hrs says it all:

“motors going very badly constantly stopping in sand. Several parties of Brecknocks overcome with heat, some dead, encountered en route. GOC stopped to speak to each [party]. Going bad had to walk long distances. Numbers of exhausted Brecknocks increasing. At Bir Amr GOC gave over cars to sick men and commenced riding.”

The situation at the next diary entry, timed at 1830 hrs, was no better:

“Saw columns of smoke arising in the direction of Lahej. Pushed on. As it became dark saw shells bursting over Lahej. Came on 15-pdr guns stuck in sand and unable to move. Met men of all regiments moving to the rear. Stopped them on gun position. Transport mules and more men all [sic] saying they had been ordered to retire. Extraordinary tales told of what had happened to troops in Lahej. GOC’s Abdali escort now bolted - and only means of communicating quickly with OC Main Body.”

With only a very sketchy picture of what was happening in Lahej Shaw could only send a very short situation report to India that evening. He cabled that part of the AMC, supported by the battery of 10-pdrs, had taken up a position just North of Lahej from where it could support the Sultan’s force. What Shaw did not report, and perhaps did not know as he was not with the AMC at this stage, was that this advance guard was exhausted and in no fit state to fight even a defensive battle. On seeing this report on the morning of 5 July the Director of Military Operations in India (DMO) added a far-sighted comment:

“The Aden Column is operating under severe climatic conditions, and is not at all too strong. Have a plan ready to reinforce Aden garrison if necessary."

It was to be nearly 60 hours before the next situation report from Shaw would reach India, which must have worried the CGS somewhat.

The command group rode on with increasing urgency to find out what was happening and to get in touch with troops in Lahej. At about 1915 hrs some men of the 126th Infantry seized the GOC’s bridle to prevent him riding forward as they thought enemy were on the road between him and Lahej. Deciding that discretion was the better part of valour, at 2000 hrs the GOC decided to return to the 15-pdr gun position which was on sand dunes about three and a half miles from Lahej. He then sent forward a Sub Assistant Surgeon to reconnoitre the road ahead and with a message for OC Main Body. That worthy soon returned saying enemy were on the road near Lahej. By 2200 hrs a considerable number of men from the Brecknocks and the 126th Baluchis had been stopped on the gun position on their way rearwards, all calling for water. Officers and men alike were exhausted. There were also unconfirmed reports that hostile local tribesmen were working round on a flank. Soon after Lieut Bingham, 109th, Orderly Officer to the GOC, returned from Lahej. He confirmed that troops were withdrawing and that casualties among officers and men had been very heavy. [In fact battle casualties had been extremely light: nearly all casualties were from heat exhaustion.]

The GSO then put a formal appreciation of the situation to the GOC that want of water was the ruling factor and that the wells two miles further back must be secured for the troops to retire on, or to advance from the next day. The OC of the 15-pdr camel battery stated that he could move his guns back by sections two miles if he had two to three hours to rest his men. The GOC approved this plan and guns and men began withdrawing to the well known as Bir Nasir. The command party reached the well at 0100 hrs on 5 July. On arrival the GSO marked out a perimeter camp with the best fields of fire astride the road, which was among acacia trees. He put men in defensive positions covering the road, with scouts out. He also organised the distribution of a small water ration to each man as well as sending a message by an Abdali horseman to OC Main Body to ask for a situation report. So what had been happening around Lahej?

The weak battalion group, based on the 109^th Inf, had at last light taken up a defensive position covering the main route from the North into Lahej. Part of the Aden Troop was deployed forward astride the ‘road’ as a screen. The main position on the road consisted of a double company of the 109th and the battalion's two machine gun sections, still with their escort. Out covering the left flank was Capt Barr with three quarters of his double company. The right flank was being covered by the 23rd Sappers & Miners with a machine gun section from the 23rd Pioneers. In ‘local reserve’, in the centre, was the remainder of Barr’s double company, under Lieut Kane together with the Aden Troop, less the detachment deployed as a screen. Soon after last light Lieut Kane took his half company to support Capt Barr on the left flank as the latter appeared to be rather isolated. [There is no record of his having been ordered to move.]

At 2030 hrs Capt Barr received a report that the troops in the centre had fallen back to the area of the Guest House. Since he was also worried that the enemy were getting round on the left of his position, he decided [without orders] to withdraw his two companies through the town to the Guest House. On arriving there, however, he found that the position in the centre had not withdrawn. He tried to get back to his original position but was unable to do so.

At 2300 hrs the remaining subunits were ordered to withdraw to the area of the Guest House. Whilst withdrawing down the main street of Lahej one group managed to capture a section of Turkish machine guns. About 100 men appear to have retreated further back to the encampment to the South of the Guest House. At midnight a fighting patrol was sent out back into the town to clear some Turks out of some houses. Since this patrol was commanded by Captain Squires, the Staff Officer to the OC Main Body, Lt Col Pearson, one can perhaps assume that the latter officer was in command at the Guest House. The patrol returned soon after, with Squires mortally wounded. He was the only British officer to be killed in action.

Capt Stocker with his Sappers & Miners reached the encampment at 0030 hrs. He gathered together all the stragglers who had fetched up there, including about 100 men of the 109th, and led them all back to the area of the Guest House, without encountering any enemy.

Returning to the GOC’s predicament of being totally out of touch, at 0300 hrs Capt Norbury (Shaw’s ADC) arrived from Lahej. The GSO wrote in the Diary that Norbury had reported that is was impossible to hold Lahej and that our troops were surrounded, as well as being heavily shelled and outranged by the enemy’s guns. On hearing this report the GOC sent a junior NCO of the Aden Troop with a message for Lt Col Pearson that he was permitted to withdraw to Bir Nasir if his position was untenable. The Sowar later returned saying he had been unable to deliver the message. Fortunately Pearson was acting on his own initiative and at 0445 hrs had organised to evacuate all casualties from the Guest House garden, and to withdraw his force to Sheikh Othman. All wounded, and those still suffering from the effects of heatstroke who were unable to march, were sent back on all available camels, which included those of  a section of 10-pdr mountain guns which had to be abandoned as a result.

A rearguard, consisting of Barr’s double company, was the last to leave the Guest House at 0600 hrs, arriving at Bir Amir two hours later, where they rested. The Main Body, centred on the other double company of the 109^th, arrived at Bir Mahomed at 1000 hrs, where they rested up for the remainder of daylight hours. They moved on again at 1900 hrs when the rearguard arrived. The Main Body arrived at Sheikh Othman at 0300 hrs on 6 July. The above timings have all been taken from the War Diary of the 109th.

From the GSO’s diary one notes that troops from Lahej had begun to arrive at Bir Nasir from 0600 hrs on the 5th. The upside was that the 109^th brought in eight Turkish prisoners, including a major and a captain, which helped to balance the news that two guns had been lost. The well at Bir Nasr ran dry at 0830 hrs. The GSO noted that the GOC then decided to withdraw to the next well one mile further back as lack of transport, food and water and ammunition had completely ruled out any possibility of an advance, without even considering the state of the troops, who were absolutely exhausted. He noted further that the Brecknocks had been unable to cope and were ‘entirely exhausted’. As they comprised the infantry reserve, in numbers half the column, an advance was out of the question.

Therefore at 0900 hrs the GOC ordered a withdrawal to the next well one mile to the rear. This was the well at Bir Amir but as the troops were on the move they were taken on to a well another mile and a half further South. The Brecknocks did not arrive there till nightfall as they had taken shelter in the grass huts at Bir Amir en route. This was the reason for the rearguard not reaching Bir Mahomed until last light.

Some of the measures that had been taken in Aden were as follows: the Senior Naval Officer was asked [sic] to move the Empress of Asia onto the eastern shore as enemy had been reported near Sheikh Othman; meanwhile the Northbrook and the Minto were standing by in the inner harbour covering the western shore; three maxim guns from the Fort’s MG Section were moved to the Isthmus position and a maxim section from the Northbrook was landed and sent up to Sheikh Othman; the OC Aden (in the absence of the GOC), Lt Col Warren commanding the RGA, put a request to the French Consul to telegraph for permission to land a draft of French troops aboard the transport Elkantara that was due in Aden that evening. This was as a precaution as the half-battalion of 108^th Inf had not yet arrived from Bombay. On 6 July Warren had troops manning an outpost line at Sheikh Othman, through which the Column could withdraw. He had also deployed one double company from No.2 Sector defences forward on the Khormaksar line. Transport and resupply had been a major problem as all available transport had been sent forward to assist in the withdrawal of the Column. Motorised transport was at a premium and the owners of private motorcars did sterling work in helping to bring in the heat exhaustion cases. This was the situation when Shaw arrived back in Aden on the morning of 6 July.

Part 3 – Shaw Replaced  and the Re-taking of Sheikh Othman

On his return to Aden Shaw sent a long situation report to the CGS in India. Although it was sent (or more to the point sent for enciphering) at 1200hrs on the 6^th it was not with the CGS until 1500 hrs the following day. It was far too long-winded for an initial report and the summary sent from India to the Secretary of State for India (S of S) by cable with a ‘clear the line’ precedence was suitably succinct. Shaw’s report was as follows:

“At 4 p.m. on July 4th the Aden troop, which until then remained in observation, reported the presence of a Turkish force estimated at 500 Turks including cavalry, with four field guns, machine guns and a large contingent of Arabs. As this force was advancing, the Aden troop fell back at the same hour (4 p.m.) on the Lahej position. The position faced North and was held by all the troops who had been able to reach Lahej, namely 250 British and Indian infantry, with a battery of 10-pdr guns. These troops maintained their position until 10 p.m. under the fire of the enemy’s artillery. By this time the northern edge of Lahej, on which the Turkish fire had been partially directed, was observed to be on fire and at the same time a change of front was necessitated by a hostile flanking movement from the mound.

During the night, hostile attacks from the West were beaten off, some hand to hand fighting taking place. But some parties of the enemy, who had penetrated Lahej from the North, continued practically throughout the night to attack with shell and rifle fire our troops and the hospital which was situated in a garden to the South of the town. The remaining British and Indian troops who, owing to want of water, had been unable to reach Lahej, were collected to cover the 15-pdr battery which in consequence of the deep sand and lack of extra camel transport had found it impossible to advance by 7 p.m. beyond a point about four and a half miles South of Lahej. At 12 midnight this supporting force was withdrawn to cover the water supply at Bir Nasr two miles further South.

Having been informed that, owing to the desertion of all transport and camelmen, and the treachery of our Arab friendlies, the troops in Lahej were no longer able to maintain their position in face of and under shell fire of the superior forces of Turks and Arabs, I ordered this force to use all available transport for the removal of sick and wounded, and to withdraw to the water at Bir Nasr. The withdrawal was carried out at 0500 on the 5th but owing to the necessity of using the only available means of transport for carrying the wounded and sick, three-quarters of the ammunition, all kits and equipment together with two 10-pdr guns and some .450 machine guns were abandoned at Lahej. I left Bir Nasr at 0930 a.m. and, in view of the fact that our troops were suffering very severely from great shortness of water and food, withdrew the force to the next water supply at Bir Amr. The enemy did not follow up and the retirement was continued at 4 p.m., Sheikh Othman being reached at 9 a.m. on 6 July.”

On the evening of the 6^th the troopship Teesta carrying drafts for Egypt from India called at Aden and was detained. A cable was sent to India requesting that these men could be used to reinforce the garrison. Whilst a reply was awaited the OC Troops, Capt Faris, was ordered to be ready to disembark the 500 men aboard, which included one double company of the 7^th Gurkhas. Altogether there were two British and 20 Indian officers. No personal weapons were aboard the ship.

Shaw sent his next report in a telegram dated 1230 hrs on 7 July. His previous telegrams had all been sent wearing his GOC’ s hat, so to speak. This one was ominously from ‘The Resident’.

“It is reported that Turkish strength at Lahej is eight battalions and 20 guns and that their intention is to attack Aden on July 9th. The Turks have offered an amnesty to all Abdali who return, and have proclaimed a Hausabi Sultan of Lahej.

In my opinion, owing in reduction in numbers of my force through excessive heat, and to loss of ammunition and transport through desertion of transport, it is impossible at this season to defend the long line necessary to protect Sheikh Othman from all sides, without thereby unduly exposing Aden, which is of Imperial importance.

For these reasons I have withdrawn into the Aden defences, and placed an outpost line extending from cavalry lines to Khormaksar bridge, supported by HM ships Minto, Northbrook, Empress of Russia and Empress of Asia, in order to protect Admiralty wireless station, which I believe is thought second to defence of Aden.

As four companies of 108^th do not arrive before 8 July I have disembarked 500 men from Teesta and armed them with Martini Henry and .303 rifles.”

Shaw had not waited for permission to use the men from the Teesta; they had been disembarked after dark on the 6^th , but the Secretary of State’s telegram saying they could be retained only arrived on the 8^th. The .303 rifles were surplus rifles of the 109^th Infantry and the obsolete Martini Henrys were from the stockpile held to be given to loyal tribal chiefs, as and when they needed to be rewarded/bribed.

Shaw was also looking around for any other reinforcements that might be able to be got to Aden in a hurry, should the situation worsen. He asked the Commissioner in British Somaliland if he could lend two naval guns and any mounted or dismounted troops. The latter replied that he could send the two guns, each with 100 rounds of ammunition, and 350-400 troops of whom 150 could be sent immediately. The Secretary of State’s telegram referred to above had also mentioned that half a battalion of Australian troops and an Indian battalion could be spared from Egypt.

The reinforcement situation improved when the wing of the 108^th eventually arrived on the morning of the 8^th. With the Teesta ‘battalion’ now disembarked and armed, the Somaliland reinforcements were stood down for the time being. As soon as they had disembarked the 108^th, together with the double company of Gurkhas from the Teesta, took over the outpost line at Khormaksar, with the remainder of the Teesta Battalion in reserve at the Admiralty Wireless Station. Shaw’s second report was much shorter than his initial one but given the time taken to encode, transmit and decode it, it was still not received by the Army Staff in Calcutta until 1125 hrs the following day, 8 July. Not surprisingly the CGS wanted more information and that afternoon Shaw was told to telegraph him with full details of casualties, losses of ammunition and equipment and the state of the troops, in particular the Brecknocks. He was also to give the strength of the mobile column when it left Aden and how many guns and machine guns were deployed. Next the CGS wanted Shaw’s views on the present situation and his intentions. The final request was about the availability of water. For what sized force was water obtainable at Sheikh Othman, at Lahej, on the road to Lahej, and then on to Nobat Dakim.

The CGS had quickly decided what was required: Aden must be reinforced and the situation restored, and Shaw replaced. Within hours of receiving Shaw’s report he had the Viceroy’s office telegraph the Secretary of State in London to approve of the intention to reoccupy Lahej. It was estimated that to achieve this a force consisting of at least one infantry brigade, one cavalry regiment and two artillery batteries would be required, over and above any reinforcements already on their way or in the garrison at Aden. All this force could not be found from India but if the infantry brigade could be found from Egypt, India could provide the remainder. Given the choice India would select Younghusband’s brigade. In any event the services of Younghusband himself were required to relieve General Shaw as GOC and Resident at Aden as the CGS had lost confidence in Shaw’s ability to be in charge of Aden.

A further short telegram sent by Shaw on the evening of 7 July cannot have eased the worries of those in India. Shaw reported that he was having to impose non-statutory martial law in Aden on account of the grave situation that had arisen. In addition a telegram the same day to the Director of Medical Services in India gave a further hint of the disaster that had befallen. He asked for two sections of an Indian Field Ambulance to be sent at once to replace two that had been lost. He also asked for one section of a British Field Ambulance and for 1,000 field dressings. The DMS replied on 8 July that the equipment for the three field ambulances would be sent as soon as shipping was available. He asked for Shaw to telegraph if it was absolutely essential to send personnel and to send further details.

The Ordnance Branch in India reacted to Shaw’s initial report of ammunition losses by making arrangements to send one thousand rounds of 15-pdr shrapnel and one million rounds of .303 ball ammunition, with a request to the General Staff that if possible it should be shipped from India on 11 July.

The Secretary of State for India, having consulted the War Office and Kitchener, gave his decision on 9 July, or in other words within hours of receiving the Viceroy’s request. As a temporary measure Younghusband’s brigade and two batteries of artillery were to be sent from Egypt to Aden. Younghusband was to leave for Aden at the first opportunity. Due to the water water situation Kitchener had queried the advisability of sending a complete cavalry regiment from India.

The Secretary of State in the same telegram asked who was the next senior [Political] officer Aden. He assumed Jacob was still there.  Jacob, as 1^st Assistant to the Resident, would have been the next senior Political Officer. He had not served with troops for at least 10 years, from the time of his transfer to the Political Service.

On 10 July a telegram was sent to Shaw telling him he was being relieved. The same telegram mentioned that a ship had left Karachi on 5 July with two 5-inch guns for Perim. These should arrive at Aden on 11 July and that Shaw could keep them at Aden if he wished.

Regarding the queries about water supply, Aden replied that between the two routes from Sheikh Othman to Lahej there was drinking water for only two British battalions. In or around Lahej there was pure water for a division, and that at Nobat Dakim the river there could also meet the requirements of a division. Shaw was then asked more questions about water: what resources for carrying water did he now possess, and what additional equipment would be needed to support four various artillery batteries, two squadrons of cavalry, an engineer company and a brigade of four Indian infantry battalions?

But water supply problems of a more urgent nature and closer to home were now a worry for both Aden garrison and the civilian population. Water was available from four sources but much the best quality water was that that came via an aqueduct from wells at Sheikh Othman. The entry in the Engineer War Diary for 8 July is pertinent: “Anticipating that the duct water supply from Sheikh Othman will be cut, I stopped the issue of duct water to private individuals on payment, took over certain Government wells which were leased out to contractors, and arranged for the issue of [condensedJ water on payment. Suggested to GOC that all water supplies should be taken over and a committee appointed to draw up rules and control the issue and distribution of water to the inhabitants.” The Turks cut off the duct water supply the following day.

On 10 July Younghusband left Suez for Aden aboard the light cruiser HMS Philomel. The  same day the 1/4^th  Hampshire Howitzer Battery and the 24^th  Hazara Mountain Battery, plus the 5th Company of 1^st  Battalion Sappers and Miners were mobilised in India for service under Younghusband in Aden. On the afternoon of the 10^th a troopship carrying the 12^th Australian Light Horse arrived in harbour. Also on 10 July one of the Turkish prisoners captured at Lahej volunteered useful information as to the strength and composition of the Turkish forces involved in the attack on 4/5 July. The infantry consisted of only five weak battalions of about 350 men in each, plus one squadron of mounted infantry, supported by 10  mountain guns. In addition about 400 Arabs were with the Turks. Here it is a good moment to mention the problems facing the attackers. The Turks were on exterior lines of communication and if the comparatively recent civil war in the Yemen was anything to go by their logistics and resupply chain would have left a lot to be desired (see Revolt in Yemen). The complete lack of proper roads within the Aden Protectorate meant that it would have been virtually impossible to resupply the size of force that would have been needed to capture fortress Aden. One other factor is worth mentioning. On 14 July information would be received that the enemy did not intend to advance on Aden during Ramadan.

On 12 July the C-in-C in India sent written orders by telegram for Younghusband, care of Shaw. Shaw was to have them deciphered in time to hand them to Younghusband on the latter’s arrival, which was estimated to be the evening of 13 July. The C-in-C also informed Shaw that he had decided that the latter would remain in Aden for the time being, at Younghusband’s disposal.

The next day the GOC 5^th  Division was informed by the Adjutant General in India that the 1st/4^th Royal West Kents were to be prepared to move at short notice to relieve the Brecknockshires. Also on 13 July Shaw telegraphed India that the aeroplanes referred to in his telegram of 7 December 1914 would be of incalculable value. Was there any chance of getting them? Evidently the answer was negative, as no aeroplanes were to be sent to Aden until late 1917, although the seaplane carrier HMS Ben-Ma-Cree would operate in Aden waters for a short period mid-1916.       

There had been one particularly unfortunate case of ‘blue-on-blue’ during the brief defence of Lahej. The Abdali himself, the Sultan of Lahej, had been shot and mortally wounded when he rounded a street corner on horseback. He died in Aden on 13 July following an operation necessitated by his wound. The GSO made another cryptic remark in his Diary: “Political Officer [Jacob] should have accompanied Column.”

Younghusband took over from Shaw at midday on 15 July. The same day it was decided in India that Brigadier General Price would be sent to Aden to take over the duties of Resident. By the 15^th Younghusband’s brigade was well on its way from Egypt, the last elements having left on the 13^th. It consisted of over 3,500 men, including 74 British and 80 Indian officers, plus 567 mules and 532 horses. The artillery consisted of eight 15-pdr guns. The infantry battalions were the 51^st and 53^rd Sikhs and the 52^nd and 56^th Punjabis. Ammunition accompanying the brigade included 600 rounds per gun, 30,000 rounds per Maxim and 1,000 rounds per rifle.

A Reuters news release seen in Aden mentioned that the monitors HMS Severn and HMS Mersey were in East African waters. Aden telegraphed India that these two ships would be most useful at Aden.

Younghusband’s first situation report must have been well received in India.

 “There is no cause for any alarm or despondency in situation here. Practically impossible for any hostile forces which could be brought against Aden to take it. I consider arrangements (by Shaw) quite secure and suitable but as soon as troops arrive from Egypt I shall occupy Sheikh Othman on three miles from present outposts, as a detached post, strongly entrenching around water supply. I do not recommend any further military operations in this season. Two strong brigades, fully equipped, are required to advance on Lahej. Only Brecknocks not satisfactory.”

At 1325 hours on 21 July Younghusband was able to send the following telegram to India: “This morning Sheikh Othman was reoccupied. Small casualties. Report follows.”

He subsequently reported that the situation was well under control and quite secure. Casualties were two British officers killed, both from 53^rd Sikhs, and one wounded, plus 20 Indian soldiers killed or wounded. Turkish forces at Sheikh Othman were estimated as having been 600 men, supported by two field guns and two machine guns.

Aden never did get the additional troops that would be needed to retake Lahej, nor did the Turks make any effort to bring up the men and equipment that would be necessary to capture Fortress Aden. For both sides the priorities were elsewhere, and more than three years of stalemate ensued.

Inglebyj