REVOLT IN THE YEMEN, 1905

[The following article on the Arab revolt in the Yemen in 1905 is described as was it was seen from the perspective of the Residency in Aden; therefore it is not intended as a comprehensive history of the revolt.]

The first indication of an impending revolt in the Yemen was from the British Vice Consul at Hodeida, Mr G A Richardson, henceforth referred to as the ‘Vice Consul’, in a report sent on 6 December 1904 to his Ambassador at Constantinople. The Ottoman Empire had divided the Arabian Red Sea coast into three Provinces: Hejaz in the North, Asir in the centre and Yemen in the South. Richardson was Vice Consul for the Yemen. Yemen had been under Turkish direct rule since 1872 and there had been a previous major revolt in 1892 and a lesser one in 1903. The root cause of the new revolt was the increasing hardship caused by a succession of poor harvests.

The provincial governor, the Vali, had asked Constantinople for reinforcements and had been told that six ships were being fitted out to provide extra troop transports. This report, together with the next two, sent on 20 December and 12 January the following year all arrived together in Aden on 18 February from the British Embassy in Constantinople. The Aden Residency then became an ‘information addressee’ and would therefore receive copies of subsequent reports directly from Hodeida. These arrived in Aden on the coastal steamer of Cowasjee Dinshaw which maintained a weekly service between Hodeida and Aden. Hence future reports would be reasonably current. The Vice Consul would soon be issued with a copy of cypher ‘K’, so that urgent reports to Constantinople could be sent by telegraph to Mokka and onwards from there by cable via Perim.

The report of 20 December had mentioned that the revolt was more serious than at first thought and was tending to become a general uprising, especially in the mountainous districts where the tribesmen were supporters of the new Imam. On a visit to Sana’a the Vice Consul had learnt that it was an open secret that the Imam would give the Turks considerable trouble. The report of 12 January mentioned the arrival of the first Turkish reinforcements at Hodeida from other provinces in Arabia. Over 2,400 men had been brought in two troop transports from Yembo, the port for Medina. But two battalions at Cunfida had refused to embark for service in the interior as they had not been paid for a year and were suffering from an insufficiency of rations. Once ashore these reinforcements were sent off towards Menakha together with 120 camels loaded with provisions and stores for the hard pressed garrisons.

By the time these reports reached Aden the road between Hodeida and Sana’a had been cut and Sana’a itself was under serious attack. A few days later, on 22 February, the Acting Political Resident at Dthala tried to send a ‘clear the line’ message by heliograph to Nobat Dakim, for onward transmission to Aden, that the Imam’s forces were reported to be within six hours march of Kataba and that the local Turkish Kaimmakam [District Officer] was about to cross the border to seek refuge. Due to atmospheric conditions this message had to be sent by runner to Aden, on receipt of which the Resident, Major General Mason, telegraphed India for instructions as to how Turkish refugees were to be dealt with. The answer was that it was important on behalf of the British Government to well treat the Kaimmakam and other refugees, passing them on down to Aden pending further orders. They must come in to the British and not to the tribes. At the same time there must be no possible excuse for the Imam to attack or pursue over the border and if the need arose the Resident should convey to him an intimation that the boundary must be respected. The Political Officer at Dthala must make it clear when affording refuge and passing on the Kaimmakam that British territory could not be made a base for operations against the Imam.

As well as from the Vice Consul and from Dthala, the Resident was also receiving reports from the Sultan of Lahej, whilst the Amir of Dthala was another source of information. Over the coming months both these chiefs would be a useful source of information, gossip and rumour and, at times, exaggeration, regarding the Imam’s progress.

Meanwhile Captain Jacob, the Political Resident at Dthala, was at Nobat Dakim was on his way back to Dthala. His contacts believed that in the event of the Imam crossing the border the Upper and Lower Yaffai and Radfan would join him, while the Amiri, Haushabi and Alawi would remain loyal. The local view was that the recent withdrawal of two of the four guns at Dthala might invite attack. Jacob’s view was that he had thought the withdrawal was a trifle inappropriate and he strongly urged for more guns to be sent up just in case – there was nothing like being prepared and the morale effect of guns was immense. The Resident decided not to send any guns for the time being as he was determined to make no move that might jeopardise Britain’s stance of strict neutrality.

On 28 February the British Embassy in Constantinople reported that the Turks were having great difficulty in sending reinforcements overland between Ma’an and Akaba due to the intense drought which had caused a high mortality rate amongst camels and other transport animals. Also the C-in-C designate in the Yemen, Riza Pasha, on his way from commanding in Tripoli had not yet been able to leave Akaba, where there was good reason to believe the troops were in a mutinous mood. Two days later the Vice Consul reported that Riza was expected soon and that it was estimated that rations at Sana’a could be made to last for another 20 days. Riza arrived on 3 March and two days later he set off towards Sana’a with a force that comprised seven battalions of infantry and eight mountain batteries of artillery. Meanwhile on 3 March Jacob had reported that the Kaimmakam did not fear a raid on Kataba and that six battalions of Turkish troops had left Hodeida and that he expected to be reinforced by some of this force. A week later General Mason decided to send two guns back to Dthala after all.

On 15 March Jacob heard a rumour that the Turkish garrison at Hijje, an important military centre northwest of Sana’a, had been massacred after refusing to surrender. The rebels were said to have captured four guns, 2,000 rifles and over 1,000 cases of ammunition. [Hijje had in fact fallen to the Imam’s forces on 2 March.] Three days later the Haushabi reported that Sana’a had fallen. Late the same evening Jacob received the same information from the Kaimmakam who had come into Dthala. He had also been told that the Vali and the Turkish garrison at Sana’a had been released after their arms and ammunition were taken from them. These reports prompted Mason to send a priority telegram to India saying that a portion of the Imam’s force was approaching Kataba if he did not confine his attention to the Turks one or two more regiments would be required at Aden.

At Dthala a meeting of the Local Defence Committee was held on 20 March and as a precaution it was decided to lay down wire entanglements in front of the defensive perimeter. The composition of this committee is not known, but other than Jacob presumably included Lt Col Mitchell (CO of the Indian Army battalion) and Captain Rickman, OC of the British troops from the 3rd Bn The Rifle Brigade; it might also have included the Amir as he had his own levies.

Jacob told Aden he had deployed a small detachment from the Aden Troop to Sanah (where the Amir already had a few of his soldiers) tasked to act as scouts to report on the Imam’s movements. Jacob intended to meet the Imam, or his Lieutenant, on his approaching Kataba and to intimate to him that the border must be respected. In his opinion it would be unwise to await the fall of Kataba before meeting him. The Imam’s primary objective would be Kataba and Jacob intended to represent the British position before the Imam was elated with Kataba’s subjugation. Jacob had vetoed a plan to occupy Sanah as both a tactical and political error; the former as a deployment there, bearing in mind the small force available at Dthala, risked a possible defeat in detail and the latter as to remain behind existing defences would help to convince the Imam of British neutrality. Mason rejected Jacob’s plan of going to meet the Imam on Turkish territory as his presence might possibly be misconstrued or misrepresented. On the other hand if the Imam crossed the border military requirements would demand prior consideration, and that Jacob’s subsequent actions would therefore largely depend upon the view taken by the Officer Commanding at Dthala. This last sentence highlights the problem area of command and control between a Political Officer and an OC Troops.

In the event that the Imam did cross the border Jacob was given a letter in Arabic from Mason stating that the British Government expected the Imam to respect the border and to act accordingly and abstain from any act or incursion that might disturb the peace between Britain and the Imam.

On 26 March Jacob informed Mason that there was absolutely no reason to fear the disaffection of any of the protected tribes. He also had reports that Husseib had been captured by the rebels who had taken possession of two guns, 1,500 rifles and a large quantity of provisions and that the Turkish losses at Hijeh had been greater than at first reported: 1,800 men had surrendered because they had no food and the rebels had taken 11 guns and one cannon, some 3,000 cases of ammunition and 2,500 rifles excluding the personal weapons of the garrison.

Another frequent source of intelligence was the periodic reports from the British Military Attaché in Istanbul, Lt Col Mansell, henceforward referred to as ‘the Military Attaché’. Unfortunately these reports sometimes were out-of-date by the time they reached Aden. At this stage they mostly dealt with the transportation difficulties the reinforcements were facing in reaching the Yemen as to save canal dues most were coming overland along a line of communication that lacked many of the basics such adequate supplies of food or water.

On 19 April the Vice Consul confirmed that Riza had reached Sana’a on 30 March but reported that only 600 of the 6,000 troops accompanying him had actually reached the town; the remainder had either deserted or had laid down their arms during the fight. Seven guns had been abandoned, together with 250 camels loaded with rations and the bulk of other transport. In fact only 50 camel loads of rations had reached Sana’a. The Vice Consul also reported that about 5,000 Syrian reservists had mutinied during the march from Hodeida to Sana’a and were being imprisoned as they arrived in gangs back at Hodeida. Most of the reinforcements into the Yemen had been Syrians and it was now necessary to await other reinforcements from Turkey, the Turks having belatedly realised that Syrian reservists were unsuited for service against Yemeni Arabs. He also reported that a further 32 battalions of Albanian and Turkish troops (as opposed to Syrian) had been requested by the deputy Vali.

This report about the Syrians was confirmed by a report from the Military Attaché from Damascus that a division which had been mobilising slowly for the past month had been stood down as it had been decided to send no more Syrian troops to the Yemen. Service in Macedonia would have been quite popular; but it was the constant lack of supplies, with the troops on starvation rations, that the men feared the most about serving in the Yemen. In addition Syrian reservists had already shown a tendency to sympathise with the rebels and many had deserted to join them. They had also had difficulty in learning how to handle the Mauser rifles that had been thrust into their hands either just before embarking at Akaba or on leaving Hodeida for the front. To replace the Syrians units being sent were from the Western portion of the Greek frontier, plus a brigade from the Black Sea coast the personnel of which were trying every means to avoid service, plus all the recruits for the year from a division in II Corps. The Attaché was of the opinion [correctly, as it turned out] that as long as Menakha was held there was some chance of success for the Turks; if they failed a crushing force could be sent from Macedonia - in fact would have to be sent as otherwise others under Turkish rule in Arabia would rebel.

On 25 April the Vice Consul sent an urgent letter to Aden that information had been received from a reliable source at Hodeida that the Sana’a garrison had surrendered to the Imam on the 20th. The telegraph from Hodeida to Mokkha had been interrupted by the rebels so Aden was asked to cable the news to Constantinople. His next report, on 2 May, was that 1,290 Albanian soldiers had arrived on 29 Apr and a further 2,500 on 2 May. So far eight battalions of Albanians had arrived and they had all been sent to reinforce the garrison at Menakha. Two caravans had already arrived from Sana’a, the first of 3,500 soldiers let go by the Imam and the second of 2,000, comprising Turkish civilians, Officers, wives and children. The Vice Consul also reported that Riza was being replaced as Commander-in-Chief and that his successor would be Marshall Ahmed Fezi Pasha who had been appointed to reconquer Sana’a and restore order in Yemen.

The Attaché sent a further report on 4 May that 16 battalions of the best fighting material available in Turkey itself were being mobilised for service in the Yemen. Marshall Ahmed Feizi Pasha, who had been commanding VI Corps in Bagdad was now on his way to Hodeida to take command of all Turkish troops in the Yemen. This officer had 30 years of experience of the Yemen and has already suppressed a revolt there with great severity. Although aged over 70 he was still said to be energetic.

On 5 May the British Consul General in Smyrna informed his Ambassador that 38 out of a total of 70 political prisoners from the Yemen who were being held on Rhodes had volunteered to do their utmost and to use their influence on arrival back in their native country to assist Officials in carrying out Government plans for reform. They had left Rhodes on the 29th of April for the Red Sea.

Next day the Vice Consul reported on the progress of relieving forces. A Brigadier General Riza had at last reached and relieved Ibb and was now moving from Ibb towards Kataba. This Riza (not to be confused with the eponymous Marshall) had started from Taiz with a small force.

Two days later the Military Attaché, back in Istanbul, reported that some Turkish officers were saying it would be better to treat with the Imam or buy him off in some way, or even to lose Yemen altogether rather than send all the troops necessary to reconquer the country, as this would seriously weaken Turkish forces facing Bulgaria. He also gave a summary of the forces sent to the Yemen up to that point:

Original garrison of Yemen 20,000
Adana Redif Bde sent Nov 1904 6,000
1st Reinforcement - 24 battalions from Syria 17,000
Recruits from Konin District 5,000
2nd Reinforcement now on way 28,000

Mason informed Simla on 12 May that the Kaimmakam of Kataba had resigned and was on his way to Aden. He was expected to stay at the Hotel d’Europe.

A few days later the Military Attaché reported that 7,000 men of a brigade from an area near Kurdistan had been mobilised. Of the other 28,000 reinforcements only one brigade (from Albania) had so far arrived at Hodeida. The greatest problem continued to be the lack of transports. The Imam’s forces were reported to be ‘quiescent’ and all enjoying the spoils of war. On 18 May the Attaché would report the mobilising of a further 16 battalions (14,000 men).

On 16 May Jacob sent an urgent despatch to Aden: The Imam’s forces were not much over a day’s march from Kataba. The garrison, though reinforced, was very anxious as a result. If the Imam approached Kataba he would of necessity, due to the topography, use Sanah and the area around it as a base for his attack. Therefore Jacob, having consulted Colonel Mitchell, was proposing to move to Sanah, with an escort of an Officer and 12-15 men from the Rifle Brigade since he considered that the best way to prove to the Imam’s satisfaction that our border was there and must be respected was to be actually in situ. Two days later Jacob visited the Turkish garrison in Kataba and had an interview with the commandant of the fortress. On his return Jacob reported that the garrison consisted of about 500 men, a mixture of Turks and Syrians and that each man has been issued with 1,200 rounds of ammunition. Predictably Mason strongly disapproved of Jacob’s visit to Kataba in the absence of orders to do so and especially as he already had orders not to cross the border himself. In his written response Mason emphasised that had no desire to be drawn into a quarrel and that therefore it was preferable to ignore any petty infringement of the boundary. Jacob was very upset by this letter, particularly as it amounted to a letter of censure which he, as the Government Representative, was ordered to show to Colonel Mitchell, Military Department.

Meanwhile the Vice Consul had reported that 45 Yemeni dissidents who had been banished to Rhodes had arrived back at Hodeida on the ship bringing General Shakir, President of the Commission for Refugees (i.e. the man who was to be president of the courts martial of those senior Turkish officers who had surrendered to the Imam!) It was hoped that some of the more influential of these Arabs would be able to persuade the Imam to agree a peace. Early in June the Deputy Vali would set out for Sana’a taking with him one of the exiles who was a personal friend of the Imam.

The terms agreed by Riza on the capitulation of Sanah included an armistice for one year, with the Turks desisting from operations during that time. The Vice Consul commented that it was perhaps significant that the large reinforcements expected had stopped arriving 10 days previously; but he thought it very unlikely that the Turkish Government would accept these terms. He added that he was getting reports of some of the tribal leaders being unhappy with the generous terms that the Imam had granted to the Turks. (Towards the end of June an informant of the Sultan of Lahej would provide confirmation that support for the Imam was crumbling and that some tribesmen had left his army and had returned home.)

In addition there had been abundant rains all over the Yemen which should ensure a good harvest later in the year; Hodeida had had an unprecedented heavy rainfall during March and April, in amounts unknown in the previous 30 years. (But in a later report came the news that the important dhurra crop had been destroyed by locusts.)

The final part of his report mentioned that a Turkish medical officer who had been in Sanah during the siege had told him that between six and eight thousand Turks had died there and that there were about a further thousand corpses on the roadside between Sanah and Menakha. The Consul also mentioned that Menakha was strongly fortified and was now defended by eight battalions of Albanians; the garrison was well stocked with provisions and the place was not likely to be taken by storm. (In other words, recalling Military Attaché’s appreciation some weeks before, the Turks might win after all.) The biggest logistical problem preventing a rapid build-up of Turkish forces was a grave shortage shipping to be used as troop transports. In his next despatch he mentioned that it was proposed to transfer an Albanian brigade to Taiz via Mokka which would advance along the axis Taiz-Sana’a when the general advance under Feizi began.

On 12 June the Vice Consul further reported that 14,000 reinforcements had arrived during May and that over 5,000 had arrived so far in June. There was a high mortality rate from typhoid and dysentery at Menakhe, some 20-30 men a day, whilst the Albanian and Anatolian reservists en route to Menakhe were equally unfortunate, with over 30 deaths daily. There had also been some deaths from sunstroke, with on one occasion 14 men dying during the first four hours of march from Hodeida. Turkish losses from all causes so far for 1905 were estimated at at least 20,000. Feizi had arrived but was making no move till he had collected 3,000 camels and 3,000 mules to carry supplies for his army when it marched to Sana’a.

By early July Mason had left Aden on sick leave, Colonel Scallon becoming Acting Resident. When two Turkish officers decided to go to Aden to purchase rations for the garrison at Kataba, Scallon asked Bombay for a ruling. The reply was pretty unequivocal: of course the Turks could buy supplies, but not the rebels. Jacob was at Nobat Dakim when he heard of the ruling and he commented that the policy of complete neutrality must have been modified. Scallon reversed the ruling, one that Mason would not have countenanced and would not have even have put to Bombay. On 26 July Bombay would agree that maintaining neutrality was paramount.

On the same day as Scallon’s volte-face, 15 July, the Vice Consul reported that Feizi would be starting his advance shortly from Menakha towards Sana’a. He had been waiting for the arrival of 1,600 mules for his transport train and also for four batteries of field artillery. At this stage, other than Hodeida, the Turks still held Menakha, Taiz, Ibb and Kataba. In fact the advance began the following day with a force of eight Albanian battalions soon occupying a village six miles northeast of Menakha without meeting any rebel resistance. However on the 17th Feizi heard that his line of communication had been cut South of Menakha on the road to Hodeida. With himself at the head he took a force of four battalions and two guns and stormed the block. His men took possession of a large quantity of gold and silver and precious rugs. The Vice Consul had heard that to try to avoid wholesale plunder by his men, Feizi had issued orders that spoils of war in every position captured were to be shared amongst his soldiers.

In his next despatch, on 26 July, the Vice Consul reported that the Deputy Vali had not actually met the Imam during the former’s mission to Sana’a. Over a period of a week they exchanged letters; the Imam had been in favour of a peaceful settlement but his close advisors and the principal sheikhs were not. The Vice Consul had also received reports of the recent assassination of over 20 of the rebel sheikhs, presumably on the orders of the Imam, but possibly due to secret intrigues by Feizi.

On 11 August the Vice Consul foresaw a speedy end to the rebellion: he had heard a report, so far unsubstantiated, that powerful chiefs who owned land astride the road Menakha-Sana’a had already tendered their submission to Ottoman rule and promised to assist the Turks against the Imam. If that was true, the Turks would not find much difficulty or meet with serious resistance in retaking Sana’a and the other towns to the North. As matters stood now the Arabs were more or less disunited and estranged from the Imam who until now had prevented them from looting Sana’a or interfering with caravans en route. In a nutshell the back of the rebellion had already been broken. There were three axes of advance on Sana’a, with the two major ones being Menakha-Sana'a and Taiz-Sana'a.

On 30 August Aden was informed by telegram by the Vice Consul that Turkish forces had occupied Sana’a the day previously, without having encountered any opposition. Towards the end of October the Military Attaché recorded that altogether 68 extra battalions had been sent to the Yemen (to in addition to the 32 that had been there before the uprising began) and that another 48 had been mobilised but not yet deployed.

At the end of November two civilian travellers, one of whom was Aubrey Herbert, arrived in Aden from Sana’a and reported on what they had seen and heard. The Turkish losses in dead were between 25,000 and 30,000 and the garrison in the Yemen was estimated at 110,000, all probably pretty accurate figures. Aubrey Herbert was at the time an honorary attaché at the British Embassy in Constantinople. He was a great friend of John Buchan and very likely was the inspiration for the character Sandy Arbuthnot in ‘Greenmantle’.

At the beginning of November the Vice Consul had called in at the Aden residency to hand in his copy of cypher ‘K’ before going home on six months well-deserved leave.

NB  Sana'a was the provincial capital whilst Sanah is a small town close to the border and opposite Dthala.